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INTRODUCTION 
If elections are the bedrock of our American democracy, election 
administrators are our masons.  While there are several entities and actors that 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.  The author wishes to thank 
Ellen Dannin for her ongoing advice, and the thousands of local and state election administrators, 
past and present, who serve daily as the guardians of democracy. 
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each interact to shape, enforce, and execute election law and policy, none plays 
a role that is as crucial as the individual or group of individuals who are 
charged with overseeing the administration of all elections in the state.  
Congressional authority in this area is limited,1 and federal courts are 
increasingly likely to defer to a state’s interest in a particular policy unless it is 
blatantly unconstitutional or discriminatory.2  State legislatures sporadically 
enact piecemeal and reactive laws that establish parameters for elections,3 and 
state courts rarely intervene to alter the course of an election.4  While the work 
of each of these entities in this context is consequential, connecting all four is 
the state entity, typically the Secretary of the Department of State,5 who is 
responsible for overseeing, interpreting, and implementing all directives from 
these authorities and, when necessary and permissible, developing her own. 
This Article builds on the premise that the Secretary of State6 is not simply 
charged with running elections, but is responsible for administering them in 
such a way that effectively promotes the dual values that are at the heart of a 
healthy democratic process: accuracy and access.7  All entities that play a role 
in the electoral process have a responsibility of promoting a healthy 
democracy, one free from discrimination, political pressures, and allowing for 
 
 1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO Doc. No. GAO-01-470, ELECTIONS:  THE SCOPE 
OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 2001), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01470.pdf. 
 2. See generally Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301 
(2004).  See also Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 533 U.S. ___ (2008). 
 3. See infra Part I.C. 
 4. Note, Toward a Greater State Role in Election Administration, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2314, 
2315 (2004) (noting that “court intervention merely sets wide boundaries within which local 
officials have broad discretion”). 
 5. In thirty-eight states, the Secretary of State is the chief administrator of all elections. In 
all but six of those thirty-eight states (Fla., Me., N.H., N.J., Pa., and Tex.) the Secretary of State is 
elected by the voters in a popular election.  National Association of Secretaries of State, Contact 
Roster, http://nass.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=89&Itemid=223 (last 
visited March 27, 2008).  Eleven states (Del., Haw., Ill., Md., N.C., N.J., N.Y., Okla., S.C., Va., 
Wis.) place the responsibility of administering elections in the hands of an appointed state board 
of elections, with as few as three (Okla.), or as many as twelve members.  US. Dept. of State, The 
Administrative Structure of State Election Offices, http://usinfo.state.gov/infousa/government/ 
elections/tech3.html (last visited March 28, 2008). 
 6. Because the Secretary of State is the chief election administrator in thirty-eight of fifty 
states, with the lieutenant government or appointed boards of elections charged with this 
responsibility in eleven other states, this article will use the term “Secretary of State” to refer to 
the entity that is primarily responsible for overseeing the administration of elections in the state. 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2000) (stating that the purpose of promoting the exercise of the 
right to vote, a duty held by “Federal, State, and local governments,” involves both 
“establish[ing] procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in 
elections for Federal office” as well as “protect[ing] the integrity of the electoral process; and . . . 
ensur[ing] that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained”). 
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the participation of the informed voter.8  But it is the Secretary of State who 
consistently serves on the “front lines” before, during, and after an election, 
and who is positioned as a bridge between the policy making entities–
Congress, state legislatures–and the local election officials who implement 
those policies.  As such, it is the Secretary of State who is most responsible for 
executing laws and programs that further the dual interests at the core of 
democracy: ensuring accurate electoral outcomes, including efforts to reduce 
fraud or intimidation and promote integrity, and prioritizing access to the vote 
by enabling the full, uniform, and equal participation of the electorate in the 
democratic process.9 
This balance is particularly crucial because some policies that are designed 
to promote accuracy, such as voter identification requirements that seek to 
reduce the possibility of voter fraud, can lead to the formation of barriers to 
voting and participation.10  But, with proper administration, such effects may 
be offset by corresponding voter education or other efforts to increase 
turnout.11  Similarly, critics contend that some laws designed to promote 
participation, such as election day voter registration,12 can lead to voter fraud, 
thus reducing the accuracy or integrity of election results.13  The use of 
election day registration in states such as Minnesota and Wisconsin, however, 
shows that effective administration at the state and county levels can ensure 
accuracy and integrity while also increasing voter turnout.14 
 
 8. See generally Raleigh Hanna Levine, The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the 
Supreme Court’s Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 225 (2003). 
 9. Several commentators have also noted the partisan undertone to the access/accuracy 
divide. See, e.g., Daniel J. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, 
Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1233 (2005) 
(describing “HAVA’s access/integrity compromise”); see also Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the 
Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 983–85 (2005) (proposing a model for nonpartisan election 
administration “where the allegiance . . . is to the integrity of the process itself, and not to any 
particular electoral outcome”).  It is just as important for a Secretary of State to bridge this 
partisan divide and recognize a balanced approach that administers elections in a way that 
furthers both goals. 
 10. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 634–35 (2007) 
(discussing the lack of evidence of widespread voter fraud, despite the reference to voter fraud as 
a justification for voter identification requirements). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. Report: Election Day Voter Registration Would Boost Voter Participation in Iowa; 
‘EDR Could Help Increase Voter Turnout Over 10 Percentage Points’, ASCRIBE NEWSWIRE, 
Mar. 22, 2007, available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/news/RMA_EDRpress-conf_3-22-
07.pdf. 
 13. Hasen, supra note 9, at 962–63. 
 14. Election Day Registration and Provisional Voting: Committee Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Elections, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mark Ritchie, Secretary of State of 
Minn.); see also infra notes 171–173 and accompanying text. 
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This Article contends that it is the Secretary of State who plays the pivotal 
role in properly administering and overseeing elections to ensure that these 
dual values of accuracy and access are promoted, enforced, and attained.  Part I 
seeks to emphasize the role that the Secretary plays through describing the 
general roles that Congress, federal courts, state legislatures, and state courts 
each play in developing and enforcing election laws.  This discussion of the 
different responsibilities of these areas of government illustrates the significant 
position that the Secretary of State occupies vis-à-vis each entity. 
Parts II and III detail several different areas of election law and 
administration where the Secretary of State plays a crucial, if not pivotal, role 
in ensuring that the goals of accuracy and access are met.  Part II focuses on 
some of the responsibilities that the Secretary of State exercises prior to 
election day.15  Comparing various examples and case law, it details how the 
actions of the state’s chief election officer can make the difference as to 
whether laws achieve the goals of promoting accuracy or access to the 
electoral process.  That section specifically discusses the Secretary’s role 
regarding the methods and ease of voter registration, managing lists of 
registered voters, and the general use of the office to promote civic 
engagement.  It also discusses the Secretary’s role in administrating voter 
identification laws. While the act of voter identification takes place on election 
day, some of the most important aspects of administration occur prior to an 
election.  Part III addresses similar issues as they relate to election day itself.  
In particular it analyzes the Secretary’s ability to work with local clerks to 
ensure that polling places function uniformly and properly, with an emphasis 
on ballot counting technology, assistance to English learning voters, and 
accommodations to voters with physical disabilities. 
PART I: THE ELECTORAL ROLE OF CONGRESS, STATE LEGISLATURES, AND THE 
COURTS 
I.A. The Congressional Role in Election Administration and Regulation 
The role of Congress in overseeing or administering elections is executed 
from afar, with most of its actions, with the exception of segments of the 
Voting Rights Act,16 potentially applying to elections throughout the entire 
country.  As a result, congressional acts relating to election administration 
 
 15. While the responsibilities of state election administrators are great and varied when it 
comes to elections, this article focuses only on five separate areas.  Other issues that are beyond 
the scope of this article include the enforcement of campaign finance laws, handling of the 
nomination and registration of parties and candidates, overseeing recounts and audits, and the 
administration of provisional and absentee ballots. 
 16. Federal oversight is particularly strong under §§ 5 and 203 of the Voting Rights Act.  See 
infra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
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must necessarily be broad and sweeping in order to be relevant to each of the 
country’s vastly diverse jurisdictions. 
Congress has explicit authority to enact laws regarding the administration 
of elections for congressional and presidential elections.17  Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution, for example, grants Congress the power to set the date for 
presidential elections.18 And although Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. 
Constitution, the “Elections Clause,” grants state legislatures the authority to 
regulate the “times, places, and manner of holding Elections” for Congress, it 
grants Congress the ability to “make or alter” these regulations.19  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to apply to presidential 
elections as well.20 
In furtherance of the power granted under the Elections Clause, Congress 
enacted the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA).21  The NVRA 
substantially increased opportunities for voter registration, most significantly 
by enabling citizens to register to vote in a federal election when they apply for 
 
 17. For a general and thorough discussion of the role of Congress in developing and 
administering election law, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1. 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the 
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same 
throughout the United States."). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators."); see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 388 (1879) (interpreting art I. § 4 to 
grant Congress expansive and supreme powers to regulate congressional elections).  But see 
Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 1995) (cautioning that 
Congress's power under the Elections Clause is not limitless and stating that Congress was 
restrained to pass laws that pertain to the state's regulation of federal elections). 
 20. See Burroughs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (extending the congressional power 
under the Elections Clause to presidential elections).  But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
supra note 1. 
The precise parameters of Congress' authority to pass legislation relating to presidential 
elections are not as clearly established as Congress' authority over its own elections . . . .  
[W]hereas Congress' authority under the Elections Clause provides for the regulation of 
times, places, and manner of congressional elections, its authority over presidential 
elections, at Article II, Section 1, Clause 4, simply provides that Congress may determine 
the time of choosing presidential electors. Despite this distinction, Congress' authority to 
regulate presidential elections is clearly not confined only to matters related to timing. 
However, federal legislation relating solely to the administration of presidential elections 
has been fairly limited and, therefore, federal case law on the subject is also rather sparse. 
Id. 
 21. National Voter Registration Act, Pub. L. 103-31, § 2, 107 Stat. 77(codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2000)); see generally Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 
F.3d 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1997); Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1413–14 (9th Cir. 
1995); Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
several challenges to congressional authority to enact the NVRA). 
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their drivers’ licenses or at various other state offices.22  But in recognition of 
state-based variances, the NVRA allowed an exemption for the handful of 
states that allow same-day voter registration.23  To that end, though the NVRA 
directed states to provide and accept completed voter registration forms at 
certain state agencies, such as any office in the state providing public 
assistance, it also allowed for some state discretion in determining which other 
agencies to provide registration, such as county clerks’ offices, public schools, 
and public libraries.24  The NVRA also granted states the authority to 
investigate suspicious voter registration applications25 and provided detailed 
circumstances under which states may permissibly purge the names of 
ineligible voters from registration lists.26 
Congress has a more limited role, however, in relation to state and local 
elections.27  This role is primarily derived from four separate constitutional 
amendments.  Each forbids specific discriminatory practices in any and all 
elections–based on race, color, previous condition of servitude,28 gender,29 
age,30 equal protection,31 or ability to pay a tax32–and each grants Congress the 
authority to enforce these prohibitions through “appropriate legislation.”33  Out 
of Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
grew the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).34  The enactment of the VRA was 
a crowning achievement of the classical civil rights movement and the 
culmination of a bloody series of events seeking political empowerment for 
African Americans in the United States.35  The Act contains several provisions 
that together form a fabric of protection against racial discrimination in all 
elections, and it allows for the appointment of federal observers to monitor 
 
 22. National Voter Registration Act § 5. 
 23. National Voter Registration Act § 4. 
 24. National Voter Registration Act § 7. 
 25. National Voter Registration Act § 8. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124–25 (1970) (holding that Congress exceeded 
its authority under the Constitution by enfranchising eighteen-year-olds in state and local 
elections). 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
 33. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 34. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 
(1966). 
 35. See generally, ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY 
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 263–66 (2000) (describing events leading to the passage 
of the VRA). 
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compliance.36  Section 2 protects against discriminatory election laws or 
practices, prohibiting any voting “qualification . . . prerequisite . . . standard, 
practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 37  Section 
202 prohibits all states and localities from using any “test or device” to 
establish voter eligibility, including literacy, English proficiency, or character 
requirements.38 Section 203 requires that certain jurisdictions provide 
translation assistance for English learning voters who are of Spanish, Asian, 
Native American, or Alaska Native descent.39 Sections 4 and 5 together apply 
to certain areas of the county–”covered” jurisdictions–that in 1964, 1968, or 
 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (authorizing the Justice Department to appoint federal observers to 
monitor compliance with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act). 
 37. Voting Rights Act § 2. As codified, this section states: 
(a)  No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results 
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
1973(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b)  A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and 
to elect representatives of their choice.  The extent to which members of a protected class 
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which 
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
 38. National Voting Rights Act § 201. 
 39. National Voting Rights Act § 203. As codified, this section states: 
A State or political subdivision is a covered State or political subdivision for the purposes 
of this subsection if the Director of the Census determines, based on the 2010 American 
Community Survey census data and subsequent American Community Survey data in 5-
year increments, or comparable census data, that– 
(i)(I) more than 5 percent of the citizens of voting age of such State or political 
subdivision are members of a single language minority and are limited-English 
proficient; 
(II) more than 10,000 of the citizens of voting age of such political subdivision are 
members of a single language minority and are limited-English proficient; or 
(III) in the case of a political subdivision that contains all or any part of an Indian 
reservation, more than 5 percent of the American Indian or Alaska Native citizens of 
voting age within the Indian reservation are members of a single language minority 
and are limited-English proficient; and 
(ii) the illiteracy rate of the citizens in the language minority as a group is higher than 
the national illiteracy rate. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2) 
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1972 required compliance with “any test or device” as a prerequisite to 
voting.40  These provisions were designed to prevent the enactment of 
discriminatory voting procedures by requiring the “pre-clearance” of all new 
election laws in these covered jurisdictions.  To receive pre-clearance, 
jurisdictions must, in part, prove to the Attorney General or the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia that their proposed changes do not have the 
effect of “retrogressing” or weakening the ability of minority voters in the 
jurisdiction to participate in the electoral process.41 
Finally, in addition to the above explicit grants of authority to regulate 
elections, the Constitution’s Spending Clause42 empowers Congress to impose 
certain requirements on states receiving funds from the federal government, so 
long as those requirements are related to the federal interest that the funding 
grants are intended to further.43  In furtherance of the Spending Clause, 
Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).44 The most 
significant provisions of HAVA provided funding for states to replace outdated 
voting machines,45 required states accepting federal funding to offer 
provisional ballots and establish state-wide computerized registration lists,46 
and required voters who registered by mail and are voting for the first time to 
show photo identification, or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, 
government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the 
name and address of the voter.47  In addition, Title II established the Election 
Assistance Commission to serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for 
the compilation and review of federal election procedures.48  Title III 
established uniform requirements for all voting systems used in federal 
elections, mandating that all voting systems purchased with the federal funds 
 
 40. National Voting Rights Act §§ 4-5. As codified, subsection (f)4 includes jurisdictions 
that in 1972 failed to provide translated materials if more than five percent of its electorate were 
members of a single language minority group.  42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)4. 
 41. This “retrogression” standard is not part of the text of the VRA, but it was articulated ten 
years after its enactment in the Supreme Court opinion of Beer v. U.S., 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) 
(holding that a district apportionment plan will be denied preclearance if it harms or leads to a 
reduction in the current electoral power of voters of color). 
 42. The Spending Clause provides, in part, that, “the Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 43. S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress could withhold federal 
highway funds from states that failed to adopt the age of twenty-one as the minimum drinking 
age). 
 44. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1668 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 15301-15545 (2002)). 
 45. Help America Vote Act § 102. 
 46. Help America Vote Act § 302. 
 47. Help America Vote Act § 303. 
 48. Help America Vote Act § 201. 
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permit the voter an opportunity to verify and change or correct their vote, alert 
voters of when they have over-voted, and produce a permanent paper record 
with manual audit capacity that could serve as the official record in the event 
of a recount.49 
I.B. The Role of Federal Courts in Election Administration and Regulation 
In recent years the role that federal courts play in overseeing the electoral 
process has gained increased attention, due in part to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2000 decision in Bush v. Gore.50  But the role that federal courts play in 
regulating elections was a source of debate and controversy long before the 
2000 presidential election.  The evolution of voting as a fundamental right 
under the U.S. Constitution originated in the 1962 Supreme Court case of 
Baker v. Carr, in which the Court established that equal protection challenges 
to redistricting plans were justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment.51  The 
Court’s subsequent analysis, two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims specifically 
articulated the use of a strict scrutiny analysis in evaluating any laws that 
potentially infringe on “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and 
unimpaired manner.”52  Under this strict scrutiny standard, a state is required to 
demonstrate a compelling interest and show that its law affecting a 
fundamental right is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  The analysis 
carries a significant presumption against any state election law abridging a 
fundamental right, and it is rare for a law to survive such scrutiny.53 
Roughly twenty years after Reynolds, the Supreme Court issued an opinion 
introducing the concept of a more flexible scrutiny for some state election laws 
and procedures.  In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court was asked to determine 
whether an early filing deadline for presidential candidates in Ohio, arguably 
making it difficult for independent candidates to appear on the ballot, placed an 
unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of independent 
 
 49. Help America Vote Act § 301. 
 50. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  Numerous law review articles have been written in 
the years since Bush v. Gore analyzing its impact on the question of the federal courts’ role in 
regulating elections.  See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
925 (2007).  For alternative taxonomies, see Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. 
Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007 (2007); Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave it to the Lower Courts: On Judicial 
Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, The 
Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
 52. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). 
 53. Though the Reynolds opinion on its face applied strictly to apportionment claims, the 
Supreme Court explicitly extended the use of strict scrutiny to any election law burdening the 
casting of the voter in Harper v. Va.  State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670–71 (1966) 
(holding that states’ use of a poll tax did was an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote that 
was not justified by or narrowly tailored to serve any compelling state interest). 
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candidates and their supporters.54  In upholding the filing deadline, the Court 
emphasized the slight deference to states provided in the Election Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution55 and concluded that any court evaluating a challenge to a 
state election law must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” against 
“the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule.”56  To this end, the Anderson Court stated that the state’s 
vague but “important” interest in regulating elections is “generally sufficient to 
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”57 
This call for increased recognition of the state’s interest in promoting a 
particular election law or procedure was fortified in the Court’s 1992 decision 
in Burdick v. Takushi.58  In Burdick, the Court rejected a constitutional 
challenge of a Hawaii law prohibiting write-in voting.59  Applying the 
somewhat relaxed standard of review set forth in Anderson, the Court 
concluded that Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting did not unreasonably 
infringe upon its citizens’ rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
The Supreme Court reasoned that all election laws “invariably impose some 
burden upon individual voters” and that subjecting “every voting regulation to 
strict scrutiny and [requiring] that the regulation be narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling state interest [ties] the hands of States seeking to assure 
that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”60  The Court re-
emphasized Anderson’s “more flexible standard” by stating that a state’s 
regulatory interests are “generally sufficient to justify” any reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the fundamental right to vote.61 
Less than ten years later came the Supreme Court’s blockbuster opinion in 
Bush v. Gore,62 overturning a decision by the Florida Supreme Court that 
ordered, among other things, a statewide manual recount of all registered 
undervotes cast for the presidency in Florida during the 2000 presidential 
election.63  Though only five Justices agreed that the recount should not go 
 
 54. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782 (1983). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1 (granting states the power to establish the time, place, and 
manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives). 
 56. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
 57. Id. at 788. 
 58. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 59. Id. at 432–42. 
 60. Id. at 433. 
 61. Id. at 434. 
 62. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 63. Id. at 102 (explaining that undervotes are those cast that do not register a selection in a 
particular category). 
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forward based on their interpretation of the Electoral Count Act,64 seven joined 
a per curiam opinion, which emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment required the creation and enforcement of uniform 
standards to guide individuals in counting ballots and votes during the 
statewide manual recount.65  The per curiam opinion reasoned that, under the 
Equal Protection Clause: 
 [T]he right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the 
franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. 
Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by 
later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of 
another.66 
The Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore also included 
murky language seeking to limit the “consideration” of the issues before the 
Court “to the present circumstances,” reasoning that “the problem of equal 
protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.”67  The 
language, along with a substantial flurry of academic commentary on the 
meaning of those terms,68 led several courts to confusingly grapple with the 
question of whether to apply the Court’s expanded interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause to other cases. 
Most notably, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits confronted the question of 
whether Bush v. Gore’s requirement of uniformity in the counting of ballots 
extended to election machinery.  In Stewart v. Blackwell, a three-judge panel of 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals initially concluded that however “[m]urky, 
transparent, illegitimate, right, wrong, big, tall, short or small,” the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Bush v. Gore “is first and foremost a decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States and we are bound to adhere to it.”69  The 
panel applied the rationale from Bush v. Gore and strictly scrutinized Ohio’s 
 
 64. Id. at 135.  For an extensive analysis of the details surrounding this aspect of the Bush v. 
Gore holding, see generally Richard L. Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 691 (2002); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog .v Hsub and its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. 
Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170 (2002). 
 65. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103, 111. Justices Souter and Breyer agreed that the lack of uniform 
recount standards implicated the Equal Protection Clause but disagreed with the other five 
Justices on the remedy, believing that the case should instead have been remanded back to the 
Florida courts upholding the recount decision but requiring the court to develop uniform 
standards to guide the recount. Id. at 134–35 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 104–05. 
 67. Id. at 109. 
 68. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in 
Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2002); Daniel P. Tokaji, Political Equality After Bush 
v. Gore, in THE FINAL ARBITER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE FOR LAW AND POLITICS 
107, 109–15 (Christopher Banks et al. eds., 2005). 
 69. Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006), superseded en banc, 473 F.3d 692, 
859 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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policy to allow the use of different ballot machines in counties throughout the 
state.  Under this analysis, the three-judge panel struck down Ohio’s policy, 
finding that some of these counties used machines with a higher error rate, and 
the state showed no compelling interest to justify its allowing the use of these 
machines.70  Similarly, in Southwest Voter Registration Education Project v. 
Shelley, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied strict 
scrutiny to conclude that the sporadic use of punch card machines violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.71 
But the impact of these two opinions is minimal.72  The Ninth Circuit 
voted to review the three-judge panel decision en banc73 and subsequently 
reversed the decision, offering almost no analysis.74  Similarly, the Sixth 
Circuit also voted to review Stewart en banc,75 which automatically vacated 
the decision of the three-judge panel.76  Concurrently, the Ohio Secretary of 
State, Kenneth Blackwell, decided to replace the punch card machines 
throughout the state.  Plaintiffs in the case then filed a brief before the court in 
which they conceded the controversy behind the case was moot, and the en 
banc court dismissed the case without an opinion on the underlying equal 
protection analysis.77 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the future applicability of the Supreme 
Court’s extension of Equal Protection Clause under Bush v. Gore, federal 
courts continue to maintain their role of ensuring that state and federal 
authorities regulate elections in compliance with the Court’s view of 
constitutional duties and limitations. 
I.C. The Role of State Legislatures in Election Administration and Regulation 
State legislatures are the primary source of laws regulating the electoral 
process.78  This central role of state legislatures is identified in the Elections 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly grants state legislatures the 
 
 70. Id. at 846. 
 71. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 900 (9th Cir. 2003), 
vacated, 344 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 72. See generally Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, supra note 68, at 9–14 
(providing a full description of the opinions, cases, and the reasons each case was vacated). 
 73. Shelley, 344 F.3d at 914. 
 74. Shelley, 344 F.3d at 918 (concluding that “reasonable jurists may differ” over the equal 
protection evaluation of the sporadic use of punch card machines). 
 75. Stewart v. Blackwell, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 76. 6TH CIR. R. 35(a) (“The effect of the granting of a rehearing en banc shall be to vacate 
the previous opinion and judgment of this Court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on 
the docket as a pending appeal.”). 
 77. Stewart, 473 F.3d at 692-94. 
 78. Note, supra note 4, at 2316 (“Subject to a few federal constraints and trace amounts of 
federal funding, states and localities have plenary authority to structure their election systems.”). 
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power to regulate the time, place, and manner of administering elections.79  It 
is also a role that has received deference from the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
has noted that states “have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects 
complex, election codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to 
both federal and state elections, the time, place, and manner of holding primary 
and general elections, the registration and qualifications of voters, and the 
selection and qualification of candidates.”80 
Through the development of the state election code, the state legislatures 
have the significant authority to enact laws imposing limits where 
constitutionally permissible on nearly everything related to election 
administration.  These areas include issues regarding ballot access,81 
registration requirements,82 voter identification requirements,83 the date and 
time of state elections,84 the casting of absentee ballots, campaign finance 
regulations, and methods of counting, recounting, and auditing election 
results.85  State legislatures also can establish remedies and punishments for 
 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of 
chusing Senators.”). 
 80. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). 
 81. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, CRIMINAL 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 1–4, http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
page/-/d/download_file_48642.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (demonstrating that nearly every 
state imposes some restriction on the right to vote for individuals with criminal convictions). 
 82. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, VOTER REGISTRATION INFORMATION 1–2, 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/voter%20reg%20info(1).pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2008) (pointing out that registration requirements vary by state).  Seven states—WI, 
MN, ME, ID, NH, WY, MT, and IA—allow voters to register up to and including Election Day.  
Other states require that voters register to vote up to thirty days prior to an election.  Id. 
 83. See ELECTIONLINE.ORG, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, VOTER ID LAWS 1 (2008), 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/voter%20id%20laws.pdf. Eighteen states 
currently require all voters to present some form of identification (photo or non-photo) when 
voting, and seven states currently require all voters to show photo identification in order to cast a 
ballot.  Further, without proper identification, Florida, Indiana, and Georgia require voters to cast 
provisional ballots.  Voters without proper identification in Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, and 
South Dakota must sign affidavits to cast regular (non-provisional) ballots.  Id. 
 84. Several states have unique laws regarding the dates of elections for state and local 
positions that provide for increased turnout.  Louisiana, for example, holds state elections on 
Saturdays.  See SUE O’CONNELL, MONTANA STATE LEGISLATURE, COMMITTEE ON HOUSE 
RESOLUTION 46, OVERVIEW OF SATURDAY ELECTIONS 1 (2007), http://leg.mt.gov/content/ 
committees/interim/2007_2008/st_admn_vet_affairs/assigned_studies/hj46saturdayelections.pdf 
(staff report for the Montana State Legislature’s Committee on House Joint Resolution 46 to 
revise election laws).  In New Jersey, election day is a state holiday. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 36:1-1 
(West 2002). 
 85. Hasen, supra note 50, at 4 (noting that many state legislatures have, with financial 
support from the federal government, promoted improved voting technology in the years 
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violations of these laws, and they are able to empower state authorities and 
agencies, such as the State Attorney General or the Secretary of State, to 
monitor or investigate certain violations. 
Perhaps most significantly, state legislatures grant a varying range of 
discretion to the state and local officials that are charged with administering 
and supervising elections.86  The effect of this grant of discretion can take 
varying forms and could potentially be so vast on the local level as to give rise 
to an equal protection violation.  In 2000, for example, Florida’s law for 
counting ballots provided that “no vote shall be declared invalid or void if 
there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the 
canvassing board.”87  This general “intent of the voter” standard granted so 
much discretion to local election officials that the U.S. Supreme Court 
expressed the concern in Bush v. Gore that a varying application of the vague 
standard gave rise to an equal protection violation. 88  No lower court has yet to 
effectively apply the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore Equal Protection rationale 
in other election administration contexts.89 
In addition, the legislative development of state election codes also varies 
widely from state to state.  Some states, for example, do not allow individuals 
convicted of certain crimes to vote, even after their sentences are completed, 
while many others only disenfranchise offenders who are currently 
incarcerated.90  Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, and a handful of other states 
 
following Bush v. Gore and arguing that as a result, “fewer votes are now ‘lost’ due to inadequate 
vote counting machinery”). 
 86. See Note, supra note 4, at 2316 (“[s]tates vary in how much power they delegate to 
counties and municipalities.  States also vary in how they provide for the selection and removal of 
local election administrators and how they fund local elections.”  However, the author also notes 
that “any delegation of power grants a measure of executive discretion that even the most 
meticulously detailed rules will not eliminate entirely.  Moreover, when administrators are not 
held accountable for rule violations—is likely, given courts’ reluctance to intervene in electoral 
disputes—the rules do little to curb discretion.”). 
 87. FLA. STAT. § 101.5614 (2007). 
 88. Tokaji, supra note 50, at 1070–71 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s expressed 
concern over the “excessive discretion vested in the local officials charged with overseeing 
elections” in Bush v. Gore and reasoning that “[j]ust as the absence of specific standards for 
regulating speech once allowed local officials to suppress the political speech of unions and civil 
rights demonstrators, the absence of specific standards for counting votes would allow partisans 
to suppress the votes of those favoring the other side’s candidate”). 
 89. See id. at 1071 (noting two federal lawsuits challenging the Ohio legislature’s failure to 
articulate specific standards governing its system of election administration under the Equal 
Protection Clause standard in Bush v. Gore, but also noting that neither case came to fruition). 
 90. E.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2007), http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/fd_bs_fdlaw 
sinus.pdf. 
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allow voters to register to vote up to and during Election Day.91  Georgia, 
Indiana, and Florida require voters to present photo identification before they 
receive a ballot on election day.92  Twenty-three states, including Illinois, 
North Carolina, and Mississippi, do not require voters to produce any form of 
identification prior to voting, other than identification requirements for first 
time voters under federal law.93 
The state-to-state variance in election laws illustrates another aspect to the 
process.  Often times, the state’s passage of laws is piecemeal,94 sporadic, and 
dominated or driven by partisan concerns.95  Such a system, void of 
consistency and sometimes even logic, has led at least one commentator to 
lament that this vast “diversity of systems” reflects either “a thriving example 
of federalist experimentation or a horrifying mishmash of self-serving 
behavior.”96 
I.D. The Role of State Courts in Election Administration and Regulation 
In his speech entitled “The Role of State Courts in the Battle for Inclusive 
Participation in the Electoral Process,” Judge George Bundy Smith, a sitting 
judge on the New York Court of Appeals,97 argued that the primary role of 
both state and federal judges is twofold.  “First, judges are required to maintain 
constant vigilance to ensure that the level playing field promised . . . in Baker 
 
 91. Minnesota Election Center, Register to Vote, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/home/ 
index.asp?page=204 (last visited Feb. 4, 2008); Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, 
FAQ’s: How to Register to Vote, http://elections.state.wi.us/faq_detail.asp?faqid=119&fid=27& 
fname=&linkid= (last visited Feb. 4, 2008); MICHAEL A. MAURO, SECRETARY OF STATE, IOWA 
ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION GUIDE, available at http://www.sos.state.ia.us/pdfs/elections/ 
EDRbrochure.pdf. 
 92. VOTER ID LAWS, supra note 83, http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/initiatives_ 
detail.aspx?id=34044. 
 93. Id. (stating that photo and non-photo identification are accepted in CA, DC, ID, IL, IA, 
ME, MD, MA, MN, MS, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OK, OR, RI, UT, VT, WV, WI, WY). 
 94. PROJECTVOTE.ORG, POLICY BRIEF NO. 11, MAINTAINING CURRENT AND ACCURATE 
VOTING LISTS 2, (2006), http://projectvote.org/fileadmin/ProjectVote/Policy_Briefs/PB11_List_ 
Maintenance.pdf (“State legislation and regulations in response to HAVA’s list maintenance 
provisions have been piecemeal and broadly drafted, lacking clearly drawn specific purge criteria 
and adequate procedures to safeguard against removal of eligible voters in error”). 
 95. See Tova Andrea Wang, Competing Values or False Choices: Coming to Consensus on 
the Election Reform Debate in Washington State and the Country, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353, 
354 (2005); see also Hasen, supra note 9, at 944 (noting that the extreme partisan nature of 
election reform post-2000 “decreases the possibility of reform being enacted in the serious and 
bipartisan manner”). 
 96. Note, supra note 4, at 2316. 
 97. George Bundy Smith, State Courts and Democracy: The Role of State Courts in the 
Battle for Inclusive Participation in the Electoral Process, 74  N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 937 (1999) 
(delivering the annual Justice William J. Brennan Lecture of State Courts and Social Justice at 
New York University School of Law). 
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v. Carr becomes and remains a reality.”98  This primarily entails, in his view, 
ensuring that the one-person-one-vote principle is preserved and enforced.  
Second, “judges must ensure that the Federal Constitution, state constitutions, 
and the Voting Rights Act are enforced to prevent discrimination against 
African Americans and other minorities.”99  In furthering this responsibility, 
Judge Smith reasons, courts must ensure that “the playing field is the same for 
all of those who play a part in determining the electoral winner.”100 
To that end, state courts occupy a precarious position in the world of 
election law.  On one hand, they are charged under every state constitution 
with resolving disputes or punishing violations of the election code that the 
state legislature develops and the state election official administers.  It is rare, 
however, for a state court to intervene to overturn an electoral outcome.  State 
election codes usually empower their courts to invalidate elections when it is 
impossible to determine the legal outcome101 or when an election is irreparably 
tainted with fraud.102  But state court intervention more typically amounts to 
ordering a recount,103 disqualifying or certifying absentee ballots,104 issuing a 
declaration regarding the counting of certain ballots as “legal” votes,105 or 
issuing criminal sanctions against individuals, including campaign officials and 
election officials, who commit acts such as voter fraud, manipulation, or 
intimidation.106 
Yet on the other hand, state courts are often the most effective and 
influential in addressing the type of enforcement that Judge Smith identifies in 
his speech, and less effective in influencing election administration on a 
regular basis.  As a Note in the Harvard Law Review observed, court 
intervention may cast a “shadow” over the duties of election officials, and 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 942. 
 100. Id. at 943. 
 101. See Akizaki v. Fong, 461 P.2d 221, 225 (Haw. 1969) (holding, pursuant to state law, 
election to be invalid). 
 102. See In re the Matter of the Protest of Election Returns & Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 4, 
1997 Election for the City of Miami, Fla., 707 So.2d 1170, 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); see 
also SAMUEL ISSACHEROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 958–960 (Foundation Press Thomson/West 2007) (2004) (citing N.Y. ELEC. 
LAW §§ 16–102 (McKinney 1999) (“the court may direct…the holding of a new primary election 
. . . where it finds there has been such fraud or irregularity as to render impossible a determination 
ass to who rightfully was nominated or elected”)). 
 103. See, e.g., Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. 1990). 
 104. Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So.2d 259, 269 (Fla. 1976) (evaluating the validity of absentee 
ballots and concluding that strict compliance with absentee ballot requirements was not necessary 
when it was possible to determine the “spirit” of the vote). 
 105. See, e.g., Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241, 1243 (Mass. 1996); Fischer v. Stout, 
741 P.2d 217 (Ala. 1987). 
 106. See ISSACHEROFF ET AL. supra note 103, at ___. 
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courts generally set “wide boundaries within which local officials have broad 
discretion.” 107  The Note contends that, for example, it is rare for state courts 
to “unseat a victor declared by a state election process.”108 As a result, any 
subsequent “hue and cry in the courts is largely futile: state and local 
bureaucrats single-handedly translate voter action into virtually final electoral 
outcomes.”109 
I.E. The Role of the Secretary of State in Election Administration and 
Regulation 
This brings us to the position of the state’s chief election official or entity, 
typically the Secretary of State, in this web of players that influence the 
administration of democracy.  Nearly every state has an official or appointed 
board that is responsible for ensuring the smooth and efficient administration 
of elections throughout the state.110  In each of the above discussions–the roles 
of Congress, federal courts, state legislatures, and state courts–the Secretary of 
State bears a great deal of the burden of ensuring that nearly each piece of 
legislation or almost every court order meets its practical goals.  Indeed, the 
responsibility, discretion, and power of the Secretary of State can even dwarf 
that of local election officials.  Though states may “abdicate responsibility for 
administering” elections to local government,111 and while the extent of that 
abdication differs a great deal from state to state,112 statewide officials are 
usually empowered to exert supremacy over the local authorities should they 
choose to do so.  In all states, for example, Secretaries of State are the final 
certifiers of all election results.113  In some states, such as Rhode Island, 
 
 107. See Note, supra note 4, at 2314–16. 
 108. Id. at 2314. 
 109. Id. at 2315. 
 110. About.com, State Election Boards and Information, http://usgovinfo.about.com/ 
blstateelection.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2008) (providing links to websites of election boards or 
officials, with links to officials for Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming). 
 111. Note, supra note 4, at 2323–24. 
 112. Id. at 2324–25 (“State-level involvement varies dramatically across the country, from 
one full-time equivalent (FTE) in South Dakota to sixty FTEs in Illinois . . . .  States also fund 
their election administration systems differently, with some states reimbursing all localities for 
their election expenses, and others forcing localities to shoulder the entire financial burden 
alone.”). 
 113. Id. 
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Secretaries of State also have the power to remove local election officials.114  
In other states involvement may be “limited to reimbursing the county for a 
percentage of its election costs, depending on the nature of the election.”115 
Apart from these differences, the state’s chief election officer exerts 
significant authority and influence over implementing the intent, goals, and 
policies of every other governmental entity involved in the electoral process.  
Because she is on the front lines of administering or effectuating the goals of 
the other actors described in this section, she must also be guided, not by 
partisanship, but by the larger values of a healthy democracy—particularly 
when the directives from other authorities are vague or delegate extensive 
discretionary authority. 
As such, it is crucial that in administering elections the Secretary of State 
recognize and actively promote democracy’s dual goals of accuracy and 
participation.  These dual goals are found in multiple authorities.  Congress’s 
stated purpose in enacting the NVRA, for example, was to both “establish 
procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to 
vote in elections” and “protect the integrity of the electoral process; and ensure 
that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.”116  Election 
law expert Tova Wang describes these dual goals, “sometimes in conflict,” as 
“making voting as easy and as accessible as possible for all Americans, and 
protecting the integrity of the vote and the voting process against fraud and 
malfeasance.”117  Others point out that Democrats are often more likely to 
support policies of promoting voter access and the related issue of equal 
participation, while Republicans typically focus on the need to promote 
integrity and the resulting higher accuracy of electoral outcomes.118  
Regardless of the partisan perspectives, or perhaps because of them, it is 
particularly important that the state’s chief election administrator seeks to 
promote both values. 
The remainder of this article analyzes the actions of various state election 
officials in light of the aforementioned goals of promoting integrity and 
accuracy while also enabling access and participation.  The primary contention 
of the analysis centers upon the view that any move that promotes integrity and 
 
 114. Id. at 2326 (citing ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING: WORKING 
TOGETHER? STATE AND LOCAL ELECTION COORDINATION 12, 14 (2002), available at 
http://www.electionline.org/site/docs/pdf/working.together.pdf). 
 115. Id. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (b) (2000).  This article takes the position that the accuracy goal also 
captures the integrity position because the primary impetus behind protecting the integrity of the 
electoral process is to ensure the accuracy of the outcome of the vote. 
 117. Wang, supra note 96, at 354. 
 118. Hasen, supra note 50, at 18; Tokaji, supra note 9, at 1207 (“For the most part, 
Democrats advocated expanded access that would enhance equality, while Republicans advocated 
tougher antifraud measures that would enhance integrity.”). 
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accuracy must be coupled with a move to increase participation and access, 
and vice versa.  And it is the Secretary of State, this article suggests, who bears 
the largest burden and responsibility in ensuring that both of these goals are 
advanced in elections throughout the state. 
PART II. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE PRIOR TO 
ELECTION DAY 
The first segment of this analysis examines the influence that the Secretary 
of State is able to wield in the roughly 360 days of the year when elections are 
not being held.  It offers examples of three different areas of election law and 
administration that come into play prior to election day: identification 
requirements for voters,119 the methods and ease of voter registration, and the 
maintenance of voter registration lists.  Certainly, state and federal courts, 
legislatures and Congress have some authority over advancing, evaluating, or 
enforcing policies in each of these areas.  But as the forthcoming discussion 
details, the Secretaries of State occupy a crucial position in implementing these 
policies.  As such, they play a pivotal role in ensuring that each policy is 
administered and applied to ensure accuracy and access to the political process. 
II.A. Voter Identification Laws 
When Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, it 
created the first federal identification requirement for voters.  HAVA requires 
that all voters who register to vote by mail and vote in person in their first 
election provide some form of acceptable identification when they arrive at the 
polls to vote.120  The federal law allows voters to present either a copy of “a 
current and valid photo identification” or “a copy of a current utility bill, bank 
statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that 
shows the name and address of the voter.”121  In addition, any voter who is 
required to show identification under HAVA and is unable to do so when they 
show up to vote is entitled to cast a provisional ballot,122 which would be 
counted if the voter presents proper identification within a certain time period.  
HAVA’s section on when to count provisional ballots, however, does not 
indicate what such a voter is required to do or provide in order to ensure their 
vote is counted.123 
 
 119. While the actual act of identification as a pre-requisite to voting occurs on Election Day, 
this analysis begins from the presumption that much of the work that goes into administering the 
law, and any related controversies, occurs prior to Election Day. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2000). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
 122. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(2)(b)(i) (“[A]n individual who desires to vote in person, but who does 
not meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(i), may cast a provisional ballot under § 302(a)”). 
 123. See Tokaji, supra note 9, at 1234 (describing this problem in greater detail). 
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Beyond those terms, the determination of what comprises “current and 
valid” photo identification or “other government document” is left to the states.  
Law Professor Dan Tokaji notes that as a result states are confronted with 
numerous questions: “Should a student ID, for example, suffice?  What about a 
bus pass?  If a student is enrolled at a public university, will a printout from the 
registrar’s office showing her address suffice?”124  States have accordingly 
developed multiple answers clarify these gray areas, with Secretaries of State 
promulgating various additional interpretations of acceptable identification. 
The lack of specificity in HAVA’s identification requirements thus grants 
significant discretion to states in determining how to administer and enforce 
the law, as well as how to publicize its requirements.  This deference leads to 
one of two outcomes, both of which implicate the Secretary of State.  The state 
legislature, particularly when enacting legislation to adopt HAVA’s 
requirements for their state elections, could enact its own legislation to fill the 
void by enacting a long list of acceptable identifications and instructions as to 
how the provisional ballot “safety net” should be addressed. Or, the state 
legislature could, like Congress, offer little to no detailed directives for 
implementing the new requirements.  And in both situations, the Secretary of 
State is charged (or left) with providing answers to any and all questions left 
unanswered and ensuring that she, the local clerks, and the voters are prepared 
for all possible election day scenarios. 
California, for example, enacted legislation with one of the most 
comprehensive and detailed interpretations of the HAVA identification 
requirements, permitting items ranging from “an ID card provided by a 
commercial establishment” to “a lease or rental statement or agreement” to a 
doctor’s prescription with the voter’s name and address to suffice as proper 
identification.125  The California law further requires that “any doubts 
regarding the sufficiency of identification presented shall be resolved in favor 
of the voter.”126  The law also allows the Secretary of State to permit “any 
 
 124. Id. at 1233. 
 125. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 20107 (2008) (the full list includes: a driver’s license of any 
state, a passport, an employee ID card, an ID card provided by a commercial establishment, a 
credit or debit card, a military ID card, a student ID card, a Health club ID card, an insurance plan 
ID card, utility bill, bank statement, government check, government paycheck, any document 
issued by a governmental agency with a voter’s name and address, a voter notification card, a 
public housing ID card, a lease or rental statement or agreement, a tuition statement or bill, 
discharge certificates, pardons, or other official documents issued to the voter in connection with 
the resolution of a criminal case, indictment, sentence, or other matter, senior citizen discount 
cards issued by public transportation authorities, ID documents issued by government disability 
agencies, ID documents issued by government homeless shelters and other temporary or 
transitional facilities, drug prescription provided by a doctor or other health care provider, tax 
return, property tax statement, vehicle registration or certificate of ownership). 
 126. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 20107(b). 
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other document specified in writing by the Secretary of State that includes the 
name and address of the individual presenting it, and is dated since the date of 
the last general election.”127  Thus, although the law establishes a detailed 
baseline of acceptable documents, and there are many, it still allows the 
Secretary of State to develop an additional set of acceptable forms of 
identification. 
Ohio took a different approach.  The state assembly did not pass any 
legislation expanding or adding detail to the HAVA requirements prior to the 
2004 election.128  This meant not only that the question of acceptable ID was 
left vague and indistinct, but there was also no additional direction offered on 
how election administrators should evaluate any provisional ballots cast by 
voters without acceptable ID.  In February 2004, then-Ohio Secretary of State 
Kenneth Blackwell sought to fill this void, announcing that provisional ballots 
cast by first time voters without proper ID would only be counted if the voters 
returned to the polling location and presented either a valid photo ID, other 
proof of name and address, their driver’s license number, or the last four digits 
of their Social Security number, before the polls closed for the day.129  After 
surviving a challenge in federal court, this significant interpretative directive 
was enforced during the presidential election in Ohio in 2004.130 
Two years later, in 2006, the Ohio legislature enacted a state law that 
expanded the identification requirements in HAVA and required all voters to 
present some form of ID at the polls prior to voting.131  The law requires all 
voters to provide proof of their identity, which can include 
a current and valid photo identification, a military identification that shows the 
voter’s name and current address, or a copy of a current utility bill, bank 
statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document, other 
than a notice of an election mailed by a board of elections . . . or a notice of 
voter registration mailed by a board of elections . . . that shows the name and 
current address of the elector.132 
Voters arriving at the polls without such identification may cast a provisional 
ballot133 and now have ten days, under state law, to present the relevant 
identifying information or documents to the local election official. 134 
 
 127. FairVote, California Electoral Situation, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=1184 (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2008); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 20107(d)(2). 
 128. Tokaji, supra note 9, at 1233. 
 129. Id. at 1234 (citing Directive No. 2004-07 from J. Kenneth Blackwell, Ohio Sec’y of 
State to All County Boards of Elections Members, Directors, and Deputy Directors (Feb. 20, 
2004) (on file with author)). 
 130. League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 340 F.Supp.2d 823, 825–26 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
 131. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.18(A)(1) (West 2007). 
 132. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.18(A)(1). 
 133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.18(A)(2)–(6). 
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Michigan has also enacted new identification requirements in recent 
years.135  Though the state legislature enacted the law in 1997, it was dormant 
until 2007 when the Michigan Supreme Court deemed the requirement to be 
“facially constitutional under the balancing test articulated by the United 
States, Supreme Court in Burdick v Takushi.” 136  The Michigan Supreme 
Court found the identification requirement to be a “reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restriction designed to preserve the purity of elections and 
to prevent abuses of the electoral franchise, as demanded by art 2, § 4 of the 
Michigan Constitution, thereby preventing lawful voters from having their 
votes diluted by those cast by fraudulent voters.”137  The Michigan law 
mandates that each individual voting in person on election day must present a 
driver’s license, state-issued photo identification, “or other generally 
recognized picture identification card.”138  Under the text of the law, if a voter 
is unable to present an acceptable piece of photo identification, she is permitted 
to “sign an affidavit . . . and be allowed to vote” but is “subject to challenge” 
by any observing individual who has “good cause” to do so.139 
Nearly two months after the Michigan State Supreme Court issued an 
opinion activating the ID requirement, Michigan Secretary of State Terry Lynn 
Land issued a set of regulations that instituted enforceable clarifications to 
guide the local implementation of the law.140  These regulations, written and 
issued without any opportunity for public comment,141 offered a limited 
 
 134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.181(B)(8) (“During the ten days after the day of an 
election, an individual who casts a provisional ballot . . . shall appear at the office of the board of 
elections and provide to the board any additional information necessary to determine the 
eligibility of the individual who cast the ballot.”). 
 135. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.523 (2007). 
 136. In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 
N.W.2d 444, 447–48 (Mich. 2007). 
 137. Id. at 448. 
 138. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.523(1). 
 139. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.727(1) (any registered voter of the precinct present in the 
polling place may challenge the right of anyone attempting to vote if the voter “has good reason 
to suspect the applicant is not a qualified and registered elector of the precinct . . . .”).  However, 
in regulations for implementing the photo identification requirement that were issued to local 
clerks prior to the November 2005 general election, the Secretary of State instructed that “[a] 
voter cannot be challenged just because he or she is not in possession of picture identification . . . 
and signs the affidavit in order to vote.” MICH. DEP’T OF STATE, PICTURE IDENTIFICATION AT 
THE POLLS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 3 (2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/ 
documents/sos/090507_Voter_Id_QA5_209294_7.pdf. 
 140. See MICH. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 140. 
 141. The lack of any opportunity for the public to weigh in and comment on the Secretary of 
State’s development of regulations was arguably in violation of Michigan law.  Section 
168.31(1)(a) requires the Secretary of State to “issue instructions and promulgate rules pursuant 
to the [Michigan] administrative procedures act . . . for the conduct of elections and registrations 
in accordance with the laws of this state.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.31(1)(a) (2001).  The 
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definition of “generally recognized picture identification card” that did not 
include, for example, photo identification issued by an employer or a credit or 
ATM card with a photo,142 both of which are acceptable forms of identification 
under Michigan’s interpretation of HAVA.143  In addition, nowhere in the 
instructions are poll workers instructed to resolve doubts as to a voter’s 
identity in favor of the voter, inviting reliance on subjective perceptions of poll 
workers as to whether a voter’s photograph clearly resembles the voter.  
According to Secretary Land’s guidelines, a voter may be directed to cast a 
provisional ballot if a poll worker does not believe that the photo in the 
identification card resembles the voter.144 
The independent actions of both Secretary Blackwell and Secretary Land 
had a significant effect on the implementation of the new identification 
requirements on voters in their states.  To that end, it is notable that the actions 
of Blackwell and Land focused on developing rules to implement the 
identification requirements in an effort to advance electoral integrity and 
accuracy.  These are laudable goals, but importantly, both Secretaries failed to 
balance their efforts to promote integrity and accuracy with likeminded efforts 
to encourage voter access and participation.  While working to develop 
regulations and add substance to their state’s or the federal government’s ID 
requirements, neither Secretary instituted additional regulations or advocated 
for new laws that would promote participation and access as a way to offset 
any limitations on access and participation indirectly caused by the new photo 
identification requirements. 
Further, either Secretary could have also used his or her position to send 
every registered voter a letter personally alerting them to the new identification 
requirements.  Or, they could send targeted letters to individuals on the 
registration list who do not have a state-issued ID or driver’s license, alerting 
them to the new identification requirements and offering assistance in helping 
them acquire the proper documentation.  In 2007, for example, Georgia’s 
 
Michigan Administrative Procedures Act requires state agencies to give notice and opportunity 
for comment prior to promulgating any “agency regulation, statement, standard, policy, ruling, or 
instruction of general applicability that implements or applies law enforced or administered by the 
agency, or that prescribes the organization, procedure, or practice of the agency, including the 
amendment, suspension, or rescission of the law enforced or administered by the agency.”  MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 24.207. 
 142. In addition to driver’s license or state issued photo identification, Michigan voters under 
the Secretary’s regulations could present a driver’s license or personal identification card with 
photo from any state or federal government, a passport, student ID with a photo from a high 
school or other accredited school, a military ID, or other tribal identification.  MICH. DEP’T OF 
STATE, supra note 140, at 2. 
 143. MICH. DEP’T OF STATE, PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENT IN POLLS 2 (2007), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/Fed_ID_ 
Req_105890_7.pdf. 
 144. MICH. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 140, at 3. 
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Secretary of State sent a written notice to over 166,000 registered Georgia 
voters who did not have a Georgia driver’s license or state identification 
card.145 
In short, in areas such as voter identification or other policies that are 
ostensibly aimed at promoting accuracy and integrity, Secretaries of State play 
an important, and sometimes overlooked, role in ensuring that those policies 
further their goals.  And if a vibrant democracy requires both accuracy and 
access, the public should look to Secretaries of State to ensure that policies that 
risk furthering one goal, accuracy, while thwarting the other, access, are 
implemented in a way as to protect or advance both values. 
II.B. Methods and Ease of Voter Registration 
Another area where the actions of a state’s chief election administrator 
make a significant impact is the area of voter registration.  The requirements 
for voter registration are generally established through state law, with the 
exception of the federal NVRA and VRA.146  The NVRA requires most 
states147 to allow individuals to register to vote when they apply for a driver’s 
license, and it also mandates that states provide and accept voter registration 
forms at several state agencies.148  The NVRA also requires that states accept a 
national voter registration form.149  In addition, § 202 of the VRA permits 
otherwise qualified residents of a state to vote in any presidential election, 
regardless of any state residency requirement, so long as the individual 
registers to vote prior to thirty days before the election.150  The Act also 
requires states to allow voters who move to another state within thirty days of a 
presidential election to vote in their former state.151 
Every state but North Dakota requires that citizens register to vote,152 and 
eight states—Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Maine, Idaho, Montana, New 
Hampshire, and Wyoming—allow voters to register on Election Day.153  Thirty 
 
 145. Votelaw, Georgia: Secretary of State Sends Letters to the Non-I.D.'ed, http://www.vote 
law.com/blog/archives/005450.html (Oct. 13, 2007, 8:31 EST). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2 (2000). 
 147. Some states that allow voters to register to vote on Election Day are exempt from NVRA 
requirements. These states include: New Hampshire, Idaho, Minnesota, Wyoming, and 
Wisconsin. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-2. 
 149. Id. 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1. 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1. 
 152. See NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, VOTER REGISTRATION IN NORTH 
DAKOTA: A HISTORY & BACKGROUND (1999), http://www.nd.gov/sos/electvote/voting/vote-
history.html (describing the history behind North Dakota’s lack of registration requirement). 
 153. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-408A (West 2001); MINN. STAT. § 201.061 (2007); WIS. 
STAT. § 6.29 (2006). 
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of the remaining forty-one states require voters to register roughly one month 
prior to election day, and eleven others have deadlines ranging from two or 
three weeks (Oregon, West Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, Massachusetts, 
Nebraska, California, Connecticut, Kansas, South Dakota, Alabama) to one 
week (Vermont).154 
Though registration requirements originated in the late 19th century 
following the Civil War and the formal enfranchisement of African 
Americans,155 the modern justification behind the registration laws in these 
forty-one states is that they promote accuracy and integrity in the electoral 
process.156  Registration requirements, for example, arguably prevent voters 
from voting more than once in multiple locations, or, because they require an 
administrator to review a registrant’s eligibility prior to processing their form, 
they prevent ineligible individuals from casting a ballot. 
That said, however, stringent registration requirements, particularly where 
they require voters to register at least thirty days before an election, have been 
shown to limit access or otherwise harm voter participation rates.157  The eight 
states with election day registration, for example, have “consistently boasted 
turnout rates 10 to 12 percentage points higher” than states that impose 
registration deadlines.158  As such, actors within each state electoral system 
must work to ensure a careful balance is struck between the accuracy and 
integrity benefits of registration requirements and making registration easy 
enough so as to reduce the potential for access limitations. 
To that end, the actions of Secretaries of State can have a direct effect on 
whether any access-impeding side effects of registration requirements are 
offset with efforts to promote participation.  As a result of efforts from 
Secretary of State Sam Reed, eligible voters in the State of Washington may 
 
 154. Rock the Vote, 2006 Voter Registration Deadlines, http://www.rockthevote.com/2006-
voter-registration-deadlines.php (last visited Jan. 24, 2008) (listing general voting deadlines, 
where the following states had deadlines approximately one month before the election date: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington). 
 155. KEYSSAR, supra note 35, at 45. 
 156. R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, VOTER REGISTRATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 3 (2005), 
available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/wps/vtp_wp30.pdf. 
 157. Hasen, supra note 9, at 965 (“When a person moves from one state to another or even 
within a state, the voter must re-register, and the person often must comply with different 
registration rules.  Those citizens who do not speak English may have difficulty finding 
registration information and forms in their language.  Registration deadlines mean that by the 
time many people start paying attention to a campaign, even a presidential campaign, it may be 
too late to register to vote.”). 
 158. DEMOS, VOTERS WIN WITH ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.demos.org/pubs/Voters%20Win.pdf. 
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register to vote online.  A Secretary’s actions, however, can also move in the 
opposite direction, enforcing or administering registration requirements in a 
way that minimizes participation and creates access barriers to the vote.  For 
example, nonprofit organizations registered under § 501(c)3 of the tax code are 
permitted under federal law to conduct voter registration drives.159  In fact, 
many citizens register to vote through the drives of one of several nonprofit 
organizations, making their role in the registration process significant in 
ensuring access and promoting participation.160  On June 14, 2004, a nonprofit 
organization in Georgia submitted several voter registration applications of 
individuals seeking to vote in a primary election on July 20, 2004.161  Three 
days later, Georgia’s then-Secretary of State Cathy Cox rejected all of the 
registrations because they were delivered to her office in a bundle and were not 
collected in the presence of an authorized individual; both of which violated 
her regulation broadly interpreting the Georgia Election Code.162 
 
 159. AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES 
OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC CHARITIES UNDER FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
AND TAX LAWS 2 (2004), http://www.aclj.org/media/pdf/040317_fed_campaign_finance.pdf. 
 160. Brennan Center For Justice, Restrictions on Voter Registration Drives Publications 
(2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_38283.pdf. 
 161. Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 324 F. Supp.2d 1358, 1361 (N.D.Ga. 
2004). 
 162. Id. at 1361.  The Court explained, 
Georgia law permits voter registration by mail.  That section of the Georgia code provides 
as follows: “The Secretary of State shall design, publish, and distribute voter registration 
application forms with which a person may apply to register to vote by completing and 
mailing the form to the Secretary of State.”  The Secretary of State interprets that section 
of Georgia law to mean that “a person” may register by sending one application in an 
individual envelope to the Secretary of State.  The state contends that sending in a bundle 
of applications in one envelope is not permitted under § 21-2-223 . . .  In the letter the 
Secretary of State's office sent informing plaintiffs' counsel that it was rejecting the 
bundled applications, it indicated that it could not accept the package because “the 
Georgia Election Code does not allow for the acceptance or collection of voter 
registration applications by any person other than a registrar, a deputy registrar, or a 
person authorized to accept voter registration applications.”  The Georgia Code places 
restrictions on “additional registration places” (which include voter registration drives) in 
that they may operate only during fixed hours and only if they have been advertised in the 
local media.  The Rules and Regulations interpreting the Election Code specifically 
provide that a deputy registrar must be present at any “additional voter registration place.”  
. . .  The state asserts that it is unable to accept bundled applications precisely because 
they were collected by someone other than a deputy registrar. So, although the anti-
bundling policy is allegedly supported by the provision of Georgia law permitting 
registration by mail only when the application is mailed by the registrant, it is also a result 
of the state's insistence that applications be collected by only a registrar or deputy 
registrar. 
Id. at 1366 (citations omitted). 
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The nonprofit organizations were forced to file lawsuits in federal court in 
order to have their registrations accepted.  On July 1, 2004, less than three 
weeks prior to election day, the court ruled that Secretary Cox’s actions 
violated the NVRA, ordered her to process the applications, and enjoined her 
office from rejecting any additional voter registration applications on similar 
grounds.163  Though litigation resolved the issue, the actions of the Secretary 
resulted in several weeks where nonprofit organizations were unable to collect 
and submit additional registrations.  The policy was later formally nullified in a 
consent decree between the Secretary and the nonprofit organizations.164 
In response to the court’s decision, the Georgia Election Board, on which 
the Secretary of State wielded considerable power, reacted.  The board 
amended its registration regulations to prohibit any non-governmental 
organizations from collecting and submitting voter registration applications 
unless they were “sealed” and also to forbid the organization from copying 
completed voter registration applications.165  In August 2006, the same 
nonprofit organizations filed another challenge in federal court.166  Two 
months later (and one month before the election), the federal district court 
issued a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of the regulations on 
the grounds that they violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to register 
voters.167 
In both 2004 and 2006, Secretaries of state in Ohio and Florida also issued 
regulations that created hurdles for groups seeking to register voters.168  Like 
the actions of Georgia’s Secretary Cox, these hurdles similarly were the result 
of an administrator placing integrity concerns high above concerns of access 
and participation in interpreting state registration requirements, instead of 
developing efforts to advance both legitimate goals. 
 
 163. Id. at 1369. 
 164. Votelaw, http://www.votelaw.com/blog/archives/003865.html (March 5, 2006, 11:15 
EST). 
 165. The Regulations provided specifically “No person may accept a completed registration 
application from an applicant unless such application has been sealed by the applicant.  No copies 
of completed registration applications shall be made.  This paragraph shall not apply to registrars 
and deputy registrars.”  GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 183-1-6-.03(3)(o)(2) (2006).  Also, 
“Notwithstanding any provision of this rule to the contrary, a valid registration application that is 
timely received by the Secretary of State or the registrars shall be accepted.”  GA. COMP. R. & 
REGS. § 183-1-6-.03(3)(o)(4). 
 166. Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. For Reform Now v. Cox, No. 06-1891, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
87080, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2006). 
 167. Id. at *20–*22. 
 168. Richard Wolf, New Voter Registration Laws Leave Thousands Off the Rolls, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 10, 2006, at 5A; see also Election Law@Moritz, Election Law Litigation, 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ litigation/diaz.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2008); Election 
Law@Moritz, Election Law Litigation, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/lucas.php 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2008). 
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In the year leading up to the 2004 presidential election, Ohio Secretary 
Blackwell issued three directives regarding the rejection of voter registration 
applications.169  Two of the directives required the rejection of completed voter 
registration forms that left blank information on citizenship or age, or where 
the applicant failed to provide driver’s license numbers or the last four digits of 
their Social Security number. The policies were in place for several months 
before Blackwell, at the behest of the Election Assistance Commission, issued 
clarifying directives overturning his policy requiring information on 
citizenship or age.170  But after a federal court challenge failed based on the 
judge’s finding that it had been filed too late, Blackwell left in place the 
requirement that hand-delivered registration forms be rejected if they did not 
include a driver’s license or Social Security number. 171  A third directive, 
issued in September 2004, just two months before election day, required the 
submission of all voter registration forms to be on heavy-stock card paper.172  
As a result, voters–—and the nonprofit organizations seeking to register them 
en masse—were unable to use photocopied forms unless they were reproduced 
on heavier, and pricier, paper.173  One month later, after advocates and their 
attorneys raised the specter of the Voting Rights Act, arguing the potentially 
discriminatory effect and animus behind the heavy-stock card paper directive, 
Blackwell backtracked and withdrew the requirement.174 
Apart from these examples of Secretaries increasing the severity of already 
stringent registration requirements, Secretaries of State can also play a pivotal 
role in ensuring that less stringent registration requirements, such as election 
day registration, are administered in a way that emphasizes and promotes the 
need for accuracy and integrity.  A statewide computer file of all voters that 
poll workers at each precinct can access and update in “real time” as a voter 
registers and casts their vote mitigates the fear of citizens traveling from 
precinct to precinct on election day to register and vote in each location.175  In 
 
 169. Tokaji, supra note 9, at 1224–28 (describing the events surrounding all three directives). 
 170. Id. at 1225. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1227. 
 173. See id. (noting that in addition to the “paper weight” directive, Blackwell also required 
that “certain federal voter registration forms be accepted even on lighter paper weight”). 
 174. See, e.g., Mary Beth Beazley & Edward B. Foley, Registration Rules: Special 
Commentary: Stealing Votes Before Election Day, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, Sept. 29, 2004, 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part1/eligibility_rules08.html. 
 175. A similar version to this example is proposed in a report produced by Election Law @ 
Mortiz.  STEVEN F. HUEFNER, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B. FOLEY, FROM REGISTRATION TO 
RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES 177 (2007) (“One 
uniformly desirable feature would be the ability to correct and update the [registered voter] 
database from each precinct on Election Day.”); see also id. at 177–78 (suggesting that to 
minimize costs concerns about that proposal, “states still could employ electronic poll books, 
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Montana, for example, computers are installed in polling locations throughout 
the state to allow election officials to access the voter registration database and 
register new voters on election day.176  As a result, this minimal registration 
requirement does not impede participation and is also administered in a way 
that protects the accuracy and integrity of the democratic process.177 
Thus, success in ensuring that registration requirements in elections 
promote both accuracy and access goals can be directly attributed to the 
actions of a Secretary of State.  While some scholars have emphasized the 
negative aspects of this role, arguing for federalized registration as a 
remedy,178 if Secretaries of State work consistently and energetically to 
balance accuracy and access issues as they relate to registration requirements, 
the holders of this office could be the most appropriate and fitting officials 
charged with this responsibility. 
II.C. Voter Registration List Management 
As the principal keeper of any statewide voter file,179 a Secretary of State 
plays the primary role in maintaining, managing, or removing voters from 
voter registration lists.  Both the HAVA and the NVRA seek to establish some 
limitations for when state officials can remove or “purge” voters from federal 
registration lists. Under HAVA § 303(a), states receiving federal funds under 
the legislation were required to create, maintain, and administer a statewide 
voter registration list.180  This maintenance included requirements that states 
periodically remove voters who are registered twice, have moved, died, or are 
otherwise ineligible.  The NVRA also requires state authorities to periodically 
make a “reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters” from the 
list of registered voters if they die, move, or otherwise become ineligible to 
 
rather than paper ones, that could share information with each other across precincts about who 
has voted, even if they did not allow changes to the registration information itself”). 
 176. Same-day Registration Has Minor Problems, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 2006. 
 177. See Ben Ysursa & Matthew Dunlap, Never Too Late to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 
2007 at A27. 
 178. Hasen, supra note 9, at 945. 
 179. Each state accepting federal funds is required to develop and maintain a statewide voter 
file.  42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b) (2000).  The ultimate responsibility for the maintenance and 
administration of the state list falls to the State’s chief election official, defined as “the highest 
ranking State official” whose primary duty is “to ensure the lawful administration of voter 
registration in Federal elections.”  U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, VOLUNTARY 
GUIDANCE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS 4 (2005), 
available at http://www.eac.gov/election/docs/statewide_registration_guidelines_072605.pdf/ 
attachment_download/file. 
 180. Help America Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 303(a), 116 Stat 1708 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 15483). 
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vote where they are registered.181  In addition, election officials are required to 
complete any list maintenance and remove any ineligible voters no later than 
ninety days before a federal election.182 
A primary purpose behind both federal requirements is to ensure that any 
state effort to purge voters from registration lists is done in a fair, uniform, and 
nondiscriminatory fashion, and in a way that does not diminish the 
participation of any eligible voters.  Both statutes, however, lack any specific 
guidelines or instructions to states as to how to remove ineligible voters from 
their lists.  States also have failed to develop any significant guidelines, 
particularly for removing individuals who commit crimes that render them 
ineligible to vote under a specific state law.183  For example, a 2004 report on 
registration management by Demos surveyed maintenance policies in fifteen 
states and found that none of them required its election officials to use “any 
specific or minimum criteria to ensure that an individual with a felony 
conviction is the same individual being purged from the voter rolls,” and two-
thirds of the states did not even require election officials to notify the voters 
they removed from the registration lists.184  As a result, voter eligibility and 
purge decisions are left almost completely to state and local election 
officials.185 
While list maintenance is an important way for election officials to 
maintain accuracy and electoral integrity, the actions of Florida’s Secretary of 
State provide two recent examples of how errors or missteps of the state’s chief 
election official can result in an elimination of access to the electoral process.  
In the months following the November 2000 presidential election, information 
came to light through a series of investigations that Florida’s Secretary of State 
hired a private firm to compile a list of registered voters who were ineligible to 
 
 181. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-6(a)(4), (c)(2)(A) (2000).  States may only remove voters from the 
registration list closer than 90 days before an election if they are reported dead, mentally 
incompetent to vote, or become ineligible under any felon disenfranchisement law.  42 U.S.C. § 
1973gg-6(a)(3)–(4) (2000). 
 182. Id. 
 183. LALEH ISPAHANI & NICK WILLIAMS, ACLU & DEMOS, PURGED! HOW A PATCHWORK 
OF FLAWED AND INCONSISTENT VOTING SYSTEMS COULD DEPRIVE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS 
OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE 2 (2004), available at http://www.demos.org/pubs/Voting_Report.pdf 
(concluding that “states, even those with identical disfranchisement policies,” conduct purges 
very unevenly because of flawed or nonexistent legislative guidance.  As a result, legal voters, 
including voters who share similar names with felons, are mistakenly taken off of voter rolls.). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Editorial, How America Doesn’t Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, at WK10 (“City 
and county election offices are responsible for adding new registrants to the voting rolls, and 
purging voters who die, move away or are convicted of felonies.  If election offices had adequate 
resources and precise rules, voting lists might accurately reflect who is entitled to vote.  But the 
reality is far more chaotic, and errors abound.”). 
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vote under Florida’s restrictive felon disenfranchisement law.186  The United 
States Commission on Civil Rights conducted hearings after the election that 
revealed Secretary Harris had dismissed the advice of the private firm and 
removed the names of thousands of voters whose names only roughly matched 
the names of individuals convicted of felonies.187  In addition, many of the 
voters wrongly removed by Secretary Harris’s purge were African Americans, 
who in Florida are also strong Democratic voters, prompting many individuals 
to question the partisan motives behind the purge.188 
Apart from maintenance efforts that result in the erroneous removal of 
voters from registration lists, the notification (or lack thereof) given to 
individuals who are removed from the rolls is also significant in ensuring that 
voter participation is not wrongfully diminished through any purging efforts.  
While Secretaries of State in most states are not required under any law to 
notify voters they remove from the list for purposes of compliance with a 
state’s felon disenfranchisement law, no election official is barred from 
providing such notice.  Notification can be important in promoting access, 
however, by ensuring that voters are aware of their removal prior to election 
day, and thus are able to address any errors and ensure they are able to vote if 
they are legally eligible.  For example, while Virginia does not require election 
officials to provide notice to voters who are removed from the registration list 
under the state’s felon disenfranchisement law, the Virginia Board of Elections 
encourages local election officials to send notices of cancellation to such 
voters, along with information on how to challenge the removal or restore their 
voting rights.189  Such a practice exemplifies how a state’s chief election 
authority can independently ensure that while accuracy and integrity are 
 
 186. Florida’s Constitution denies individuals from voting for life if they are convicted in any 
state of any felony. FLA. CONST. art VI, § 4 (amended 1992). It is possible for voting rights to be 
restored after application to a state executive review board, though in practice only a few 
clemencies have been granted.  E.g., Jason Grotto & Debbie Cenziper, Clemency System Veiled in 
Secrecy, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 2004, at 16A. 
 187. Editorial, supra note 187; see also U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, Chapter 5: The 
Reality of List Maintenance, in VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/ 
ch5.htm. 
 188. Robert E. Pierre, Botched Name Purge Denied Some the Right to Vote, WASHINGTON 
POST, May 31, 2001, at A01. (describing one woman who was removed because her sister had 
been convicted of a felony and was ineligible to vote); Hasen, supra note 9, at 965–66 (noting 
that the Harris list of voters to purge from the list “included a number of ‘false positives,’ that is, 
persons who should not have been listed as felons.  The error in part was caused by the name-
matching program used by the private company, in which nonfelons with names similar to felons 
were placed on the purge list.  It appears that somewhere between 1000 and 8000 eligible voters-
many African-Americans with Democratic voter registrations-were removed from the list because 
they were incorrectly identified as ineligible former Florida felons.”). 
 189. PROJECT VOTE, supra note 95, at 3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
374 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII:343 
promoted through the removal of legally ineligible voters from registration 
lists, voter rights and access to participation are not wrongly affected through 
the removal of otherwise eligible citizens.190 
PART III. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON ELECTION 
DAY 
On election day the Secretary of State, local election officials and poll 
workers take center stage.  Thus, the analysis shifts from discussing how a 
Secretary of State can work effectively within the legal boundaries set by 
Congress, the state legislature, and the courts to a view of how the Secretary 
interacts with local election officials on election day.  The interaction is 
different, but just as important, because the Secretary has the ability to work 
with local clerks to ensure voters’ experiences and outcomes are consistent 
throughout the state.  And even without legislative mandates, the Secretary 
may also have the power to set goals, such as limits on ballot spoilage rates191 
or provisions for assistance for English Learning voters,192 for local officials to 
follow and which promote accuracy, uniformity, and access. 
 
 190. In 2006, the Secretary of State of Kentucky came under fire from the state Attorney 
General after he did not notify voters who were removed from Kentucky's list because of a 
potential change in residency.  Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Stumbo 
Challenges State Board of Elections and Secretary of State on Number of Eligible Voters Purged 
(Sept. 18, 2006), available at http://ag.ky.gov/pmc/KII.Portal.MediaCenter.CMS.Templates/PMC 
ConnectedPressReleasePage.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRNODEGUID=%7B6A990437-10B 
4-4C8A-A5E9-626869D833DD%7D&NRORIGINALURL=%2Fnews%2Feligiblevoters 
purged.htm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest; see also PROJECT VOTE, supra note 95, at 3 
In a very broad interpretation of the state laws, Kentucky officials concluded that voters 
whose names later appeared on the Tennessee or South Carolina voter databases had 
implicitly requested removal from the Kentucky voter list. This list of cancelled voters 
was generated not by notification from elections officials in other jurisdictions that the 
person had registered in that jurisdiction, but by a simple voter database match. As 
Kentucky deemed that those voters requested removal from the voter rolls, the Kentucky 
election officials determined that these voters were not entitled to notice of their removal. 
The Kentucky Attorney General filed suit to stop the purge program. The Kentucky 
Franklin Circuit Court ruled in favor of the attorney general finding that the Defendants 
had conducted an illegal purge under Kentucky law. 
Id. 
 191. Ballot spoilage rates are a calculation of the number of ballots that are cast but which do 
not register any votes for the highest office on the ticket.  For a survey of the disparities of ballot 
spoilage rates in the 2000 election, see THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
DEMOCRACY SPOILED: NATIONAL, STATE AND COUNTY DISPARITIES IN DISFRANCHISEMENT 
THROUGH UNCOUNTED BALLOTS, http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/electoral_ 
reform/ResidualBallot.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 192. Former Iowa Secretary of State Chet Culver voluntarily provided voter registration 
forms in five different languages, a practice continued by his successor, Michael Mauro. Iowa 
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The following section details three specific aspects to election day 
administration over which the Secretary of State is able to exercise authority 
sufficient to ensure the protection of integrity and accuracy and the 
encouragement of uniform and equal access to the ballot box.  First and 
foremost, the Secretary has the ability to set standards and mandates to 
promote uniformity and decorum at precinct polling locations.  This includes 
issuing clear directives to clerks and establishing policies that ensure all voters 
are adequately accommodated and protected when they arrive to vote.  A 
related duty concerns the mechanisms for counting the votes that are cast on 
election day.  In many states, Secretaries of State are the primary decision 
maker in selecting voting machines, ensuring they are impervious to misuse, 
and providing training for all local officials and, potentially, all poll workers.  
Finally, because some of the problems that occur on election day may be 
unpredictable, this section also considers the importance and rapidity of the 
Secretary of State’s response to any problems that occur throughout the day.  
From precincts running out of ballots to challengers causing a ruckus at the 
polls, a statewide election official who is aware of and quickly responds to any 
mishaps can play a pivotal role in preventing any election day meltdowns. 
III.A. Polling Place Policies 
Most Secretaries of State have the discretion to issue instructions regarding 
several aspects of election day administration, ranging from regulating the 
behavior of challengers in polling places, to providing translated election 
materials, to helping ensure that citizens are aware of their polling place 
locations, and to enforcing any voter identification procedures.  Though some 
state and federal laws also regulate polling place behavior, most of the details 
are left to state and local election officials. 
In recent years, for example, several Secretaries of State have gone beyond 
the requirements of state and federal law to provide translated election 
materials or recruit appropriate translators to serve in jurisdictions with 
multilingual constituencies.  Federal and state laws requiring election officials 
to provide translated materials omit several constituencies and languages.193  In 
independent efforts to address any omissions, Secretaries of State in several 
states, including California, Iowa, and Washington, voluntarily post translated 
election materials, such as voter registration and absentee ballot request forms, 
 
Secretary of State, Iowa Voter Registration, http://www.sos.state.ia.us/elections/Voter 
Information/VoterRegistration.html (last visited February 1, 2008). 
 193. For further discussion of the omissions of current state and federal translation 
requirements, see, e.g., Jocelyn Benson, Language Protections for All? Extending and Expanding 
the Language Protections of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION 
OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER, 327–30 (Ana Henderson 
ed. 2007). 
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on their websites, in languages ranging from Spanish to Laotian to Russian to 
Bosnian.194 
Though polling place locations are predominantly determined by local 
election authorities,195 in many states the state election officials can exercise 
some influence over the number and location of polling places as well as the 
type of machines they receive.  An exercise of state authority can also offset 
any local maneuvers or changes that would have the intent or effect of 
disenfranchising voters or harming the integrity of the election.196  Through 
mailings or a website, state officials can also institute programs to ensure all 
voters in the state receive or can access information about their polling 
place.197  State officials can also ensure that early voting locations or any local 
Secretary of State offices are equally dispersed throughout the state and 
accessible to underrepresented constituencies.  And where possible, state 
officials can and should intervene when local authorities move polling places 
away from underserved populations—unlike the actions of the Tennessee 
Election Commission, which in 2005 approved of a decision to close a precinct 
in an area with many elderly and disabled voters, requiring this somewhat 
immobile group of voters to travel an extra mile to reach their nearest 
precinct.198 
Finally, state officials can institute guidelines to limit chaos at polling 
locations on election day.  Such statewide instructions and regulations can also 
protect voters from intimidation and disruption from “challengers,” or 
representatives of political parties and other groups present in the polling 
 
 194. See, e.g., California Secretary of State, Multilingual Voting Services, 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_multi.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2008); Iowa Secretary of 
State, Voter Registration, http://www.sos.state.ia.us/elections/VoterInformation/Voter 
Registration.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2008); Washington Secretary of State, Elections & Voting, 
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2008). 
 195. See Note, supra note 4, at 2315 (“The 2004 efforts by both parties reflected a 
fundamental realization: election administrators exercise discretion.  And like any actor with 
discretion, an election administrator can, within limits, help a cause or kill it.”). 
 196. Id. (describing the efforts of local election officials to move “early voting locations far 
from disfavored populations” and lengthen “wait times” for voters) (citing John M. Glionna, Nov. 
2 Is V-Day for Blacks in Florida, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at A1 (“In a [Florida] county the 
size of Rhode Island, the only voting site is in a predominantly white community, a location 
inaccessible by public transportation, 30 miles away from black neighborhoods.”)). 
 197. In an effort to limit the potential for intimidation and harassment, the Michigan Secretary 
of State, for example, has issued regulations that forbid challengers from speaking to voters in the 
polling place.  See MICH. DEP’T OF STATE, ELECTION NEWS 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/ELNEWs56_219590_7.pdf (declaring that “challengers 
do not have the authority to approach voters or talk to voters in the polls or within 100 feet of any 
doorway being used by voters to enter the building in which the polling place is located”). 
 198. Note, supra note 4, at 2318 (citing Duane W. Gang, Efforts Aim at Ousting Director of 
Elections, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 10, 2005, at A1). 
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place.199  In their book, From Registration to Recounts, researchers at the 
Center for Election Law @ Moritz discussed the benefits of a challenge 
procedure, particularly its potential for “deterring voter fraud or other improper 
attempts to influence election.”200  The book issued a number of 
recommendations that could be instituted from a state legislature, Secretary of 
State, or local election officials to balance the accuracy and integrity benefits 
of a challenger process with procedures to protect voters’ access to the polls.201  
Among its suggestions are the importance of a challenge procedure providing 
“adequate due process to voters, including an opportunity to present evidence 
demonstrating their eligibility to vote” and a process that “deter[s] an overly 
aggressive use of challenges.”202 
Recent events in Michigan illustrate how a challenge process can go awry 
and the impact a Secretary of State can have in attempting to limit future 
problems.  In a 1999 city election in Hamtramck, Michigan, members of a 
group named “Concerned Citizens for a Better Hamtramck” (CCBH) placed 
challengers, as permitted under state law in Michigan, in over half of the 
polling locations throughout the city.203  Throughout the day, the 
organization’s challengers questioned the eligibility of over forty voters with 
Arabic-sounding surnames.204  A CCBH member would require the 
“challenged” voter to take an oath of citizenship in English in order to vote,205 
even if the challenged voter was able to produce an American passport.206  The 
U.S. Department of Justice subsequently sued the city of Hamtramck for 
approving the organization and allowing the challengers to treat the voters in a 
discriminatory fashion.207 
 
 199. HUEFNER ET AL., supra note 176, at 178. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 173–86. 
 202. Id. at 178. 
 203. Jocelyn F. Benson, ¡Su Voto Es Su Voz! Incorporating Voters of Limited English 
Proficiency into American Democracy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 251, 298 (2007). 
 204. Complaint at 1, U.S. v. City of Hamtramck, No. 0073541 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2000), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/hamtramck_comp.pdf (“This action arises out 
of the general election that took place in Hamtramck, Michigan on November 2, 1999.  In that 
election, more than forty dark-skinned or Arab-American citizens were required to take an oath as 
a condition to voting, a requirement that was not imposed on white voters.”) 
 205. Id. 
 206. Consent Order and Decree at 4, U.S. v. City of Hamtramck, No. 0073541 (E.D. 
Mich.Aug. 7, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/hamtramck_cd.pdf 
(“Some voters were challenged before they signed their applications to vote.  Other voters were 
challenged after they had signed their applications and their names had been announced.  The 
challenged voters had dark skin and distinctly Arabic names, such as Mohamed, Ahmed, and Ali.  
The challengers did not appear to possess or consult any papers or lists to determine who to 
challenge.”). 
 207. Id. 
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Several years later, a few days before the November 2006 election, the 
Michigan Secretary of State issued a policy that banned the use of video 
cameras, cell phones, cameras, televisions, and recording equipment from the 
polls “to ensure that all voters . . . have a full opportunity to exercise their right 
to vote in private without undue distractions or discomfort.”208  The regulations 
also, for the first time, prohibited challengers from approaching or talking to 
voters “for any reason.”209  While this broad ban itself led to some confusion 
on behalf of mainstream political parties wishing to place representatives at the 
polling locations on election day to assist voters in the voting process,210 the 
Secretary’s act arguably also had the effect of protecting voters from less 
innocent organizations such as Concerned Citizens for a Better Hamtramck. 
III.B. Voting Technology 
One of the central issues on election day is the accuracy and accessibility 
of the machines voters use to cast their ballots.  The role of the Secretary of 
State in selecting and implementing ballot counting technology has received 
increased attention in the post-2000 election world.  This is due in part to the 
difficulties that emerged in Florida and Ohio in 2000 and 2004, respectively, as 
well as the enactment of HAVA, which provided over $300 million for states 
wishing to replace outdated voting equipment and $3 billion for other voting 
system improvements.211  Any states receiving federal funds must maintain 
voting systems that meet certain standards, including providing the voter with 
the opportunity to correct any errors in a ballot before it is cast.212  The Act 
also requires that new machines have the capacity for audits, and at least one in 
each polling place must be accessible for individuals with disabilities. 
Despite this federal support for improved technology, a 2007 report from 
Electionline.org and the Pew Center for the States reported in many places, the 
 
 208. MICH. DEP’T OF STATE, ELECTION NEWS 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/Issue_40_177190_7.pdf (making exceptions for 
broadcast stations and news media representatives to be present in certain areas of the polling 
room, stating: “Regardless of whether a film crew making such a request positions themselves in 
the public area of the polling place or the entryway to the polling room, the precinct chairperson 
must supervise the filming process to ensure that the secrecy of the ballot is fully protected and 
no voters are inconvenienced by the filming process.”). 
 209. Id. at 3. 
 210. See, e.g., Amber Hunt and John Wisely, Turnout High, With Some Glitches, Workers 
Say, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 8, 2006, at 11 (describing lawsuits filed on Election Day in 
Detroit, Michigan over compliance with the Secretary of State’s ban on challengers talking to 
voters). 
 211. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, “HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 
2002”: NASS/NCSL SUMMARY 2002, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/nass-
ncslsummaryw-orecs.htm. 
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (2004). 
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new machines “have not instilled . . . confidence in the election systems.”213  
The report indicated that the actions of the Secretary of State were particularly 
important to ensuring that the transition to new machines promoted the dual 
goals of accuracy and access that the HAVA drafters sought to accomplish 
with the legal changes.  When detailing some of the problems with the 2002 
transition to new systems, the analysis specifically pointed to “poor training 
and machine glitches” as a “large part” of the “meltdown” that occurred in 
places such as Broward and Miami-Dade counties in Florida.214  The authors 
noted, however, that the actions of a Secretary of State in nearby Georgia 
enabled a “far smoother transition to the new technology,” particularly due to 
then-Secretary Cox’s work to coordinate “detailed hands-on training and 
preparation” for all poll workers in the state.215 
Allocation of machines is also an issue, and one that in most states the 
Secretary of State can directly influence.  One infamous example of their role 
in distribution of technology occurred in Ohio during the 2004 presidential 
election, when then-Secretary Ken Blackwell misallocated machines in several 
locations, leading to voters having to wait in line in some precincts as long as 
five hours.216  During the day of the election, the Ohio Democratic Party filed 
suit against Blackwell on behalf of voters in two Ohio counties that did not 
have enough electronic machines to accommodate the large numbers voting 
that day.217  The lawsuit requested that the court order the boards of elections 
in both counties to provide other options for voters—namely, paper ballots—to 
use instead of waiting in line for hours to cast their vote.218  A federal judge 
later that day mandated that paper ballots be provided to those still in line 
waiting to vote in the counties.  The judge’s order, however, did not—and 
indeed, could not—provide a complete remedy for many of the voters who still 
waited in line for several hours after the polls had closed in order to cast their 
vote.219 
A third area of development in election technology surrounds growing 
questions regarding the accuracy and reliability of voting systems.  At the 
center of much of the controversy are Direct Recording Electronic (DREs) 
 
 213. ELECTIONLINE.ORG, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT 
AT 5 2 (2007), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/HAVA.At.5.pdf  (noting also 
that “[e]lectronic voting system glitches, snafus and full-blown breakdowns in Sarasota County, 
Fla., Carteret County, N.C., Montgomery County, Md. and other localities have eroded 
confidence in paperless systems”). 
 214. Id. at 13. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Tokaji, supra note 9, at 1238; see also id. at 1220-22 (detailing the causes and results of 
Ohio’s failure to upgrade all of their voting machines by 2004). 
 217. Id. at 1238. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1239. 
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machines, which many critics argue are subject to tampering and other security 
concerns.220  Across the country, Secretaries of State have led the charge to 
investigate the concerns and, where founded, have decertified machines that 
fail to prove secure, accurate, or reliable.  In 2007 alone, chief state election 
officials in Colorado,221 Kentucky,222 Ohio,223 and California224 engaged in 
systematic investigations into the reliability and accuracy of their voting 
systems. 
Making perhaps the greatest statement was California Secretary of State 
Debra Bowen, who in August 2007 announced that she was decertifying the 
three voting systems that were used in most of California’s counties after 
“expert reviewers demonstrated that the physical and technological security 
mechanisms . . . for each of the voting systems analyzed were inadequate to 
ensure accuracy and integrity of the election results and of the systems that 
provide those results.”  Among Bowen’s findings was evidence that the 
“Diebold software contains vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to 
install malicious software on voting machines and on the election management 
system, which could cause votes to be recorded incorrectly or to be 
miscounted, possibly altering election results.”225  Bowen’s initiative in 
reviewing and subsequently decertifying these voting systems throughout the 
entire state of California serves to underscore the significant effect the actions 
a Secretary of State can have on promoting the accuracy and integrity of 
elections.  And through restoring or encouraging voters’ faith in the electoral 
system, her actions also promoted access and participation in the democratic 
process. 
 
 220. E.g., Tim Padgett, Voting Out E-Voting Machines, TIME, Nov. 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1680451,00.html; Jim McElhatton, Touch Screen 
Voting Faulted, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at B01 (describing concerns with the security of 
electronic voting systems). 
 221. Christopher Osher, Coffman: Voting Machines Don’t Measure Up, THE DENVER POST, 
Dec. 17, 2007, available at http://origin.denverpost.com/ci_7744376. 
 222. GREGORY D. STUMBO, ENSURING YOUR VOTE COUNTS: KENTUCKY’S ELECTRONIC 
VOTING SYSTEMS, ATTORNEY GENERAL GREG STUMBO’S INVESTIGATIVE REPORT & EXPERT 
REPORT (2007), available at http://www.eac.gov/voting%20systems/docs/report-kentucky-
voting-systems-certification-process2.pdf/attachment_download/file. 
 223. JENNIFER L. BRUNNER, PROJECT EVEREST: EVALUATION AND VALIDATION OF 
ELECTION RELATED EQUIPMENT, STANDARDS AND TESTING (2007), available at http://www.sos. 
state.oh.us/sos/info/EVEREST/00-SecretarysEVERESTExecutiveReport.pdf. 
 224. California Secretary of State, Voting Systems Review, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ 
elections_vsr.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008). 
 225. DEBRA BOWEN, WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL OF DIEBOLD ELECTION SYSTEMS, INC., 
GEMS 1.18.24/ACCUVOTE-TSX/ACCUVOTE-OS DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING SYSTEM & 
CONDITIONAL RE-APPROVAL OF USE OF DIEBOLD ELECTION SYSTEMS, INC. GEMS 
1.18.24/ACCUVOTE-TSX/ACCUVOTE-OS DRE & OPTICAL SCAN VOTING SYSTEM (2007), 
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/diebold_102507.pdf. 
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CONCLUSION 
The above discussion seeks to emphasize the central role of a state election 
administrator in promoting a healthy democracy.  It recognizes that a state’s 
chief election official or board is a direct extension of the government, and 
thus they may only engage in actions that they are permitted to take under state 
and federal law.  For example, Secretary of State of California Debra Bowen 
was specifically empowered under California law to “conduct periodic reviews 
of voting systems to determine if they are defective, obsolete, or otherwise 
unacceptable.”226 
But in addition, whether an official has wide or cabined discretion, her 
ability to exercise judgment and influence over how elections are administered 
is significant.227  As such, academics, advocates, and voters alike should hold 
accountable a state’s chief election official to act in a way that promotes access 
and accuracy in administering elections.  Similarly, state election officials must 
recognize their unique responsibility to not only avert election crises but also 
sidestep partisan concerns and political pressures.  Through placing a greater 
focus on the ability and responsibility of a Secretary of State to further neutral 
democratic goals, all actors move slightly closer to the systematic promotion of 
a healthy democracy. 
 
 226. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 19222 (West 2003). 
 227. Several commentators have suggested confining a Secretary of State’s discretion, but 
admit that it is impossible to completely eliminate it. E.g., Hasen, supra note 9, at 978–79; Note, 
supra note 4, at 2315–16 (discussing proposals for “precisely designed rules - like crafting a 
precise definition for what constitutes a valid vote” for state election administrators). 
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